Functions:
The main functions of the IAEA are to: encourage and assist research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that such activity assisted by the Agency is not used to further any military purpose; apply safeguards to relevant activities at the request of Member States; apply, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international treaties, mandatory comprehensive safeguards in non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) Parties to such treaties.
In carrying out its functions, the Agency conducts its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations for furthering the establishment of worldwide disarmament through safeguards. The Agency's safeguards system is defined primarily in Art. XII of the IAEA Statute, and in the following documents: INFCIRC/66 (designed to be applied in any state that concluded a Safeguards Agreement), INFCIRC/153 (used as a basis for agreements with States Parties to the NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
Verification and Compliance:
Verification: Under Safeguards Agreements, IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify records maintained by State authorities on the whereabouts of nuclear material under their control, to check IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment, and to confirm physical inventories of nuclear material. These and other safeguard measures provide independent, international verification that governments are abiding by their commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. A precondition for the implementation of safeguards is a formal safeguards agreement between the Agency and the State. ⋅ Condemning Iraq's decision on 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, demanding that it rescind its decision, resume dialogue and begin full cooperation with the Agency; stressing that the Agency's Action Team should continue to further investigate any aspects of Iraq's nuclear program (GC(42)/RES3, adopted, 25 September 1998); ⋅ Appealing to all States not parties to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety (GC(42)/RES/10, adopted, 25 September 1998); ⋅ Emphasizing that Member States make all necessary efforts to have contingency plans in place for nuclear power plants, fuel cycle and medical facilities which use radioactive materials well before 31 December 1999, in order to share information and handle potential problems which may arise due to the Year 2000 problem (GC(42)/RES/11, adopted, 25 September 1998);
⋅ Encouraging all governments to join in international co-operative efforts to strengthen the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials (GC(42)/RES/12, adopted 25 September 1998); ⋅ Expressing "grave concern" and strongly deploring the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998; calling on them to conclude the Additional Protocols as called for by resolution (GC(41)/RES/16, adopted, 25 September 1998); and ⋅ Urging all States to become Parties to the NPT and the CTBT and to place all their nuclear material and facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without delay and conditions; urging all States to support negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their commitments under Article VI of the NPT (GC(42)/RES/19, adopted, 25 September 1998); and
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© Center for Nonproliferation Studies IAEA-4 IAEA ⋅ Confirming the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to immediately accept the application of IAEA Safeguards in the region; calling upon "all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region"; and "inviting all countries to adhere to the international non-proliferation regime" (GC(42)/RES/21, adopted, 25 September 1998).
In addition, the General Conference decided to endorse a statement by the President on the inclusion of the agenda item "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat." The statement noted that the item had been discussed in the 42nd session and that certain Member States intended to include the item on the provisional agenda of the 43rd session of the General Conference (GC(42)/DEC/11, issued, September 1998).
1997:
The 1997 session of the General Conference, 29 September-3 October, adopted resolutions: ⋅ Calling upon Iraq to cooperate fully with the Agency in the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq (GC(41)/RES/23, adopted, 23 October 1997); and ⋅ Confirming the urgent need for all parties in the region to immediately accept the application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East and "calling upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region" (GC(41)/RES/25, adopted, 25 October 1997).
Board of Governors
In accordance with the statute and the existing practice, the board is responsible for approving safeguards procedures and safeguards agreements, and for the general supervision of the Agency's safeguards activities. The board generally meets five times a year: March, June, before and after the regular session of the General Conference in September, and immediately after the meeting of its Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee in December. At its meetings, the board also examines and makes recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA's accounts, program, and budget and considers applications for membership.
Secretariat
The IAEA Secretariat carries out programs and activities approved by the Agency's policy-making organs. The Secretariat is headed by the Director General (DG), who is the chief administrative officer and is appointed for a term of four years. The DG is responsible for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the Agency's staff. Four offices report directly to the DG:
⋅ Secretariat of the Policy Making Organs (PMO): Tasked to enable the General Conference and the Board of Governors to effectively perform their statutory responsibilities and their other functions and to ensure that all meetings of the Policy Making Organs are conducted efficiently.
⋅ Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS):
Established to increase the Agency's ability to change through improved management practices, program performance, and enhanced accountability. 
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security:
The Secretariat's Department of Nuclear Safety and Security is responsible for the Agency's efforts to protect people and the environment from radiation exposure. It consists of four programs: Safety of Nuclear Installations, Radiation and Transport Safety, Management of Radioactive Waste, and Nuclear Security.
Developments:
2005: On 3 February, the director general informed States Parties that in accordance with Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the majority of States Parties requesting him to convene a conference to consider the proposed amendments to the convention was reached on 19 January 2005.
On 16-18 March, the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future was held in London, England. The conference considered the threat of malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material; the achievements and shortcomings of national and international efforts to strengthen the prevention of, detection of, and response to such acts; and ways to achieve future im-
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provements. The conference noted that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest global threats.
The conference noted that instruments that underpin the international nuclear security framework include the CPPNM and the possible amendment of the CCPNM, the Code of Conduct, other relevant conventions, and IAEA safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol.
The conference identified the following priorities for strengthening nuclear security: continued efforts to enhance the prevention of terrorist acts, and the physical protection and accountability of nuclear and other radioactive material in a comprehensive and coherent manner.
The conference recognized the leading role of the IAEA for improving the global nuclear security framework and for promoting its implementation.
The conference identified future areas of progress:
• Accelerate efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response 
Developments:
2005: On 14 June, the director general, in a statement to the Board of Governors, noted the proposal by the United States aimed to establish a committee to consider ways and means to strengthen the safeguards system. The director general expressed his hope that the board will be in a position to act on this proposal at its June session.
On 23 September, the Board of Governors agreed on modifications to the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to strengthen the safeguards system. The modifications require states to provide initial reports to the IAEA on all their nuclear material and early design information for any planned nuclear facilities, and reinstate the IAEA's right to conduct inspections in SQP states. The previous SQP text did not require states to report small amounts of nuclear material to the IAEA.
2004:
In its Safeguards Statement, the IAEA drew the following conclusions based upon the evaluation of all information available to the IAEA for 2004:
• Safeguards were applied for 152 states with safeguards agreements in force with the agency.
• With regard to 61 states with both CSAs and APs in force or otherwise applied, the agency concluded that all nuclear material in those states remained in peaceful nuclear activities or has been otherwise adequately accounted for.
• For 37 states, evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remain in progress.
• Iran, Libya, and North Korea had been found to have been previously engaged in nuclear activities of varying significance, which they had failed to report. Verification of the correctness and completeness of their respective declarations is ongoing. Committee, as well as nuclear verification and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. On 18 June, the meeting focused attention on Iran's failure to comply with IAEA safeguards. The board considered an agency report following a series of visits to Iran by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and other senior IAEA officials following allegations that Iran is completing two secret nuclear facilities-a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak. The report indicated that Iran failed to meet its obligations under its IAEA Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material, and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored. The chair of the board, Kuwaiti Ambassador Nabeela Al-Mulla, referred to the findings of the IAEA report on Iran in her summary of the meeting, thereby reflecting the board's concern that Iran failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement (for further information, see Safeguards non-compliance, below).
2003:
The primary issues addressed in the 2002 Annual Report were nuclear safety, nuclear security, compliance, nuclear terrorism, and the strengthening of safeguards. ElBaradei noted specifically the need for comprehensive assurances and integrated safeguards for a more effective and efficient IAEA verification system. The draft Annual Report for 2002 summarizes the scope and results of agency activities throughout the year, with an introductory chapter that considers the agency's work within the context of overall nuclear developments and key related issues.
On 18 it is slated to grow to $25 million by 2007. The majority of the increase will go toward the verification program, which has increasingly had to rely on extrabudgetary funds to fulfill its growing number of mandates.
2002:
The Board of Governors approved a "blueprint," which is known as "The Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards," in its meeting held on 18-22 March 2002. The blueprint represents a new approach to safeguards implementation; it integrates all the safeguards measures that are now available to the Agency in an optimum way. This framework will guide the Secretariat in fulfilling its ongoing safeguard obligations and responsibilities.
2001:
The Board of Governors held its meeting in Vienna on 11-14 June 2001 to review the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the year 2000. The Board concluded that in 2000 in the 140 States (and Taiwan or China), which had Safeguards Agreements in force, the Agency found no indication of diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards or of misuse of facilities, equipment, or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards. For seven States, which have a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol in force or being provisionally applied, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material in these States had been placed under safeguards and was used for peaceful purposes.
2000:
On 5-8 June 2000, the Board of Governors reviewed the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the past year. In 1999, the IAEA concluded that in States with Safeguards Agreements in force, declared nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Secretariat found no indication that the nuclear material, which had been declared and placed under safeguards, had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment, or non-nuclear materials placed under safeguards were being misused.
1997:
On 16 May 1997, the Board of Governors approved new strengthened measures for use by its inspectors who verify States' compliance with their commitments not to produce nuclear weapons. The new measures are detailed in an agreed Protocol under which countries would accept stronger, more intrusive verification on their territories. The key objective of the new measures is to enhance the IAEA's capability to detect possible clandestine nuclear activities in NNWS and thus to increase confidence that these States are abiding by their obligations. However, while the protocol is part of a plan for strengthened and more efficient safeguards in NNWS, it also contains measures that could improve safeguards in other States, including nuclear weapon States. These new measures provide enhanced access for inspectors-access to more information about States' nuclear programs, current and planned, and access to more locations on their territories. Inspectors will have access not only to nuclear sites but also to other locations that could contribute to a nuclear program, such as research or manufacturing facilities. The new measures include use of state-of-the-art technologies to trace nuclear activity through samples taken from the environment and remote operation surveillance and monitoring systems at key locations in the inspected State. States accepting the protocol will also be required to simplify the designation of inspectors and visa requirements for them, thus facilitating inspections at sites on short notice. Many of the new measures have undergone extensive field trials in cooperating Member States and build on reinforcing steps already implemented under the IAEA's existing legal authority.
Questions of Compliance:
This section covers questions related to compliance with safeguards agreements by the Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Iraq.
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:
2004: On 19 February, the Additional Protocol between the ROK and the IAEA entered into force.
On 23 August, during initial discussions between the agency and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on its declaration of nuclear materials and activities contingent on its acceptance of its Additional Protocol, ROK revealed to the agency that rogue scientists within the country had conducted laboratory-scale experiments to enrich uranium past the civil enrichment level. The board meeting of 13 September 2004 stated that, while these activities were considered a breach of the ROK's prior commitments, they did not constitute a proliferation hazard since they were conducted in only insignificant quantities.
EGYPT:
2005: In January, a circumstance similar to that of the ROK's transpired, in which it was reported that Egypt had engaged in unreported uranium conversion activities, with most of the work carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. In response to the situation, the director general, on 28 February 2005, was quoted as saying, "It is regrettable that some activities have not been reported to us, although, again as we have said
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IAEA-11 before we haven't seen a proliferation concern." However, he went on to stress that states must take their reporting and nonproliferation obligations with the upmost seriousness. This matter was not referred to the board.
IRAN:
Iran ratified the NPT on 2 February 1970 as one of the original signatory states and concluded its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/ 214) with the IAEA on 15 May 1974. By the mid-1970s, Iran initiated a nuclear power program, but the 1979 revolution ended all nuclear efforts until 1984, when Iran revived its nuclear power program. Iran's plans for building a civilian nuclear power program have prompted much concern among some Western countries, in particular the United States. Although the NPT allows transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states, the United States has been strongly opposed to such cooperation with Iran as it believes that Iran is misusing this provision of the NPT to obtain and develop technologies and materials for a clandestine nuclear weapons program. On 18 December 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/540), which provides for a substantial expansion of the IAEA's authority to visit any facility ─declared or not─ to check for clandestine nuclear facilities and to investigate any questions or inconsistencies arising from Iran's comprehensive safeguard declarations. Although Iran has stated that it is acting in accordance with the Protocol's provisions, ratification by its parliament remains a necessary condition its entry into force.
2006:
On 3 January, the director general informed the Board of Governors of Note Verbale in which Iran notified the IAEA of its decision to resume "R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension."
On 10 January, IAEA inspectors confirmed that Iran had begun to remove IAEA seals on its enrichmentrelated equipment and material at Natanz. On 7 January 2006, Iran requested that the agency remove, before 9 January 2006, specified seals at Natanz, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique. Based on the information currently available, the removal of agency seals at the enrichment site at Natanz, and at two related storage and testing locations, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique, will be completed by 11 January 2006. The cascade hall and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz will continue to be covered by agency containment and surveillance measures. Director General ElBaradei expressed concern over Iran's decision to terminate the suspension of enrichment-related activities requested by the IAEA Board of Governors before the agency has clarified the nature of Iran's nuclear program.
On 13 January, the IAEA received a document for circulation entitled "E3/EU Statement on the Iran Nuclear Issue" from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany that reports on a meeting in Berlin, 12 January 2006. The statement finds that Iran's decision to restart enrichment activity "a clear rejection of the process the E3/EU and Iran have been engaged in for over two years with the support of the international community." It goes on to state that Iran continues to challenge the authority of the IAEA board and stresses the need to respond firmly to this challenge. In their statement, the E3/EU conclude that the involvement of the Security Council is necessary in reinforcing the authority of IAEA resolutions and signal their intention to call for an "Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting with a view for it to take the necessary action to that end."
On 18 January, the representatives of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom sent a letter to the chair of the IAEA Board of Governors requesting that a special meeting be held to discuss the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran and related board resolutions. The special meeting has been scheduled for 2 February.
On 24 January, Iran submitted a Note Verbale to the IAEA entitled "Short Glance on Iranian Nuclear On 27 February, Director General ElBaradei issued another report (GOV/2006/15) for the Board of Governors to consider in its meeting on 6 March. The report states that, although the IAEA has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature of Iran's nuclear program. The two outstanding issues concerning the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture, and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs require further clarification. The director general urged Iran to provide full transparency and take necessary measures to build confidence.
On 6 March, the Board of Governors convened in a meeting to review the director general's 27 February report and discuss Iran's nuclear program among other agenda items. No resolution was adopted but instead the board agreed to a carefully worded summary prepared by its chair, Ambassador Amano from Japan. The Chairman's Summary highlighted the division within the board. It indicated that some members expressed regret at the lack of implementation of the confidence-building measure requested of Iran and at Iran's declared intention to suspend the voluntary implementation of non-legally binding measures, including the Additional Protocol. It also showed that other members expressed frustration at the slow pace of progress of the IAEA's work in clarifying outstanding questions relating to Iran's
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IAEA-13 nuclear program and that the agency is still unable to provide assurance as to the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran. On the other end of the spectrum, the summary revealed that members recognized that Iran had taken corrective and continued transparency measures. They encouraged Iran's continued cooperation with the IAEA and also "re-emphasized the distinction between voluntary confidence building measures and legally binding safeguards obligations." Some other members emphasized that Iran's nuclear issue should be addressed within the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
In accordance with the resolution adopted on 4 February, the director general's report on Iran's nuclear program was transmitted to the Security Council on 8 March, at the close of the meeting. On briefing the press, Director General ElBaradei once again emphasized the importance of diplomacy prevailing and the need to prevent further escalation of tension. In this regard, the director general advised all the states involved to tone down their rhetoric and also to seek a "cool-headed approach." He stated that the IAEA will continue with its verification work and ask Iran to heighten its level of transparency. At the same time, the Security Council will be tasked to deliberate this issue and to "lend its weight to the IAEA's efforts so as to make sure Iran will work as closely as possible" with the agency.
On 28 April, the Director-General submitted his latest report on Iran's implementation of its safeguards agreement to the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council. This report was prepared at the request of the Security Council in its presidential statement on 29 March 2006. The Security Council statement requested "in 30 days a report from the Director-General of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration." In anticipation of the Director-General's report, Iran submitted a letter in which it indicated its willingness to cooperate in terms of complying with the Additional Protocol, provided that the case is dropped by the Security Council and returned to the IAEA.
The Director-General's report did not reflect any elements of progress in the IAEA's verification work in Iran. As had been in the case of all previous reports, this latest report does not provide conclusive evidence that Iran's nuclear program is not designed exclusively for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the report confirmed Iran's claims to have enriched uranium to the level of 3.6%. With regards to Iran's statements in press reports that it is conducting research and development on and testing P-2 centrifuges, a more sophisticated type of enrichment technology, the Director-General's report does not offer any further insights. The report reiterated the calls in previous reports in urging Iran's full cooperation and transparency, "transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol." The report noted with regret that Iran has not been forthcoming with implementing these additional transparency measures. This fact, in addition to Iran's decision to cease implementation of the Additional Protocol in February 2006, has severely impeded the IAEA's verification work in providing clarification on the outstanding issues and assurance as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. According to the report, while the safeguards system of the IAEA remains indispensable in verifying a state's compliance with its treaty obligations, it is not equipped with the means to verify a state's "future compliance or intentions."
On 8 June, the Director-General circulated his latest report (GOV/2006/38) for the board members to consider at its meeting that convenes on 12 June. The report covers developments since April and reflects the stalled progress in resolving outstanding verification issues. Iran has continued to withhold important information that could provide the key to mending gaps in understanding in the agency's verification work, such as the 15-page document "describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres." Furthermore, the report details recent Iranian nuclear activity, which includes resumption of uranium enrichment. The report states that on 6 June 2006, Iran "started feeding UF6 into the 164-machine cascade." In addition, according to the report, Iran is continuing its installation work begun in April on other 164-centrifuge networks.
2005:
On 2 March, after the board's meeting, the director general commented that while the agency has no new revelations on Iran's nuclear program, it is making good progress in understanding its nuclear activities, particularly with regard to the outstanding issue of enrichment. However, the director general stressed the need for additional information and transparency from Iran. In a parallel development, the director general expressed the agency's support in negotiations between Iran and the European Union supported EU3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany), and, recently, the United States. These multilateral talks seek to reach a solution on Iran's declared capacity of enrichment. The board also con- To address these concerns, the resolution called on Iran to "be pro-active in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues."
During the 2004 NPT PrepCom held between 26
April and 7 May, the United States used the conference as an opportunity to condemn Iran's alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, pointing to Iran's failure to fully comply with its Safeguards Agreement.
On 21 May, Iran submitted its initial declarations pursuant to its Additional Protocol.
On 1 June, the Director General issued a report detailing the Agency's progress with the implementation of safeguards in Iran. While this report continued to find that Iran had engaged in a high degree of cooperation with the Agency, there are a number of issues that have yet to be fully resolved, including the following:
⋅ After stating that it had not received P-2 centrifuge components from abroad, Iran revealed that it had in fact acquired magnets relevant to P-2 centrifuges from Asian suppliers. On 30 May, Iran provided the Agency with information on the quantities and sources of these imported magnets. In addition, Iran admitted to making inquiries with a European intermediary regarding the procurement of 4,000 magnets suitable for use in P-2 centrifuges, although no magnets have been delivered by the intermediary.
⋅ While Iran has provided additional evidence to clarify the discrepancy between the enrichment levels of the uranium contamination found at the Kalaye Electric Company, Natanz, and Farayand Technique, Agency experts believe more information will be required before this issue can be resolved. Although Iran claimed that it does not know the origin of this equipment, it has identified some of the intermediaries involved. The Agency has questioned these intermediaries and has concluded that, without additional information, "it is unlikely that the Agency will be able to conclude that the 36 percent uranium-235 contamination found at Kalaye and Farayand was due to components originated from the State in question."
⋅ The Agency has concluded that Iran understated the amount of plutonium that it produced, although the amounts produced were in the milligram range. In addition, this plutonium was found to be more recently produced than the 12-to 16-year range specified by Iran.
⋅ While the Agency has been able to verify Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment activities, it has found Iran's continued generation of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at the Uranium Conversion Facility to be, "at variance with the Agency's previous understanding as to the scope of Iran's decision regarding suspension."
On 18 June, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a resolution that essentially reiterated the concerns of previous resolutions. Although the resolution welcomed Iran's submission of its Articles 2 and 3 declarations under the Additional Protocol, it deplored the fact that Iran's cooperation with the Agency had not been "as full, timely, and proactive as it should have been," particularly noting the postponement of Agency visits originally scheduled in March until mid-April, thereby delaying the process of environmental sampling and analysis. ⋅ The accuracy of the Iranian statements regarding its P-2 centrifuge enrichment program and its chronology continues to be in question. What remain unanswered are questions regarding the scope of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture, and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 design. The alleged absence of P-2 centrifuge related activities in Iran between 1995 and 2002 and the P-2 centrifuge procurement-related activities are also subject to further investigation. Given concerns over clandestine supply networks, ongoing IAEA investigations should shed light on the origin of both Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge enrichment program.
⋅ According to Iran, the low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) particles found on different locations of the Iranian territory derive from imported P-1 centrifuge components. On 21 September, the Iranian government announced the resumption of their enrichment program, which had voluntarily suspended as a confidence-building measure.
After intense negotiations between the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the EU3, an agreement was reached regarding Iran's enrichment activities on November 14.
As a confidence-building measure and not as a legal obligation, Iran agreed to suspend all enrichmentrelated and reprocessing activities, specifically the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing, or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation. In return, the E3/EU will support the IAEA Director General, inviting Iran to join the Expert Group of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The agreement also stated that once suspension has been verified, the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume. The E3/EU will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
On November 15, in the report by the Director General to the Board, the Agency stated: "All the declared material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. The Agency is, however, not yet in a position to conclude that there is no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran" On November 22, the IAEA Director General stated that the IAEA was verifying that Iran had stopped all the enrichment and related activities that it was committed to in the agreement. He announced that the Agency would be able to confirm the information by November 25.
However, the Board, in its resolution of November 29, noted its concern with Iran's continuing to include, in its enrichment activities, the production of UF6 up to November 22, in spite of a request by the Board in September to suspend all enrichment activities. Additionally, it recognized the voluntary status of Iran's acceptance of its AP and its non-legally binding agreement to suspend enrichment as part of a confidence-building gesture. The Board also recognized States' rights to pursue civilian nuclear programs under Treaty obligations.
2003:
Concerns over Iran's nuclear program increased in February 2003 when Iranian authorities revealed a new plan to develop a nuclear energy program using entirely domestic resources. The United States in particular raised concerns that these facilities might contribute to Iran's development of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which would enable Iran to build nuclear weapons without importing nuclear material. These concerns particularly relate to Iran's compliance with its safeguards undertakings; concerns regarding the undeclared imported nuclear material (UF6, UF4, and UO2); the processing and use of this material without notifying the IAEA at a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz; and the development of a (still not operating) uranium enrichment plant. In addition, questions have been raised regarding the on-going construction of a heavy water production plant and plans for constructing a 40-megawatt (th) heavy water research reactor at Arak. ⋅ welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol, and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and activities.
Following the Board's consideration of the Iranian report, Director General ElBaradei in his concluding statement remarked: "there is a need to encourage Iran to cooperate fully and demonstrate full transparency" to resolve the outstanding questions identified in the IAEA report as soon as possible before the next Board meeting in September 2003, and that, if deemed necessary, the Board could meet at a special session to consider further options.
Further discussions on the outstanding questions regarding Iran's nuclear program and Iran's possible conclusion of an Additional Protocol took place throughout July and August 2003, with visits to Iran by the Director General and IAEA technical and legal experts. Environmental samples taken from the Natanz facility that indicated the presence of highly enriched uranium particles were chief among the outstanding issues requiring clarification. In addition, the IAEA requested permission to take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and to visit two other locations (Lashkar Ab'ad and Ramandeh) where nuclear-related activities were alleged to have occurred. Both of these requests were granted in mid-August. At the same time, Iran also expressed to the IAEA its readiness to begin negotiations on the Additional Protocol.
In preparation for the September Board of Governors meeting, the Director General's second report was issued on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement. The report provided an update on the status of the issues raised in the previous report, and included new questions that had arisen over the course of the more recent discussions. In particular, the report noted that:
⋅ Having acknowledged in August that uranium conversion experiments had taken place in the early 1990s, Iran is in the process of gathering and providing further information. The IAEA is continuing its efforts to audit and verify the import and use of the nuclear material.
⋅ The Agency is continuing discussions on the presence of depleted uranium detected through environmental samples, and is awaiting results of samples taken from other nuclear facilities.
⋅ The IAEA is evaluating new information received in August regarding the chronology and details of Iran's centrifuge enrichment program, and is awaiting environmental samples taken from the Kalaye Electric Company workshop.
⋅ In working with Iran to identify the origin of highly enriched uranium particles detected at the Natanz pilot enrichment plant, the IAEA will conduct discussions with relevant Iranian personnel and will visit relevant locations. In addition, the Agency has requested assistance from Member States that have knowledge of any external nuclear-related assistance provided to Iran.
⋅ The Agency is evaluating design information on
Iran's heavy water reactor. The report concluded that although Iran has demonstrated an increased degree of cooperation with the Agency, including its decision to begin negotiations on the conclusion of an Additional Protocol, "it should be noted that information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental and that…some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran. In addition, there remain a number of important outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Iran's enrichment program, that require urgent resolution. Continued and accelerated co-operation and full transparency on the part of Iran are essential for the Agency to be in a position to provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States."
The second report was considered during the Board of Governor's September 2003 meeting, with Board members debating several proposals regarding the most effective way to proceed. Two draft resolutions (one by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and another by South Africa) were submitted on the first day of the Board meeting, but the resolution that was ultimately adopted on 12 September was based on a later draft submitted by Australia, Canada, and Japan (GOV/2003/69). The resolution urged Iran to provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency to the IAEA, and to ensure that no further reporting failures occurred. The resolution further expressed concern with regard to: The resolution called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities and any reprocessing activities as a confidence-building measure, pending assurances by the Director General and satisfactory application of the provisions of the Additional Protocol. It also designated a 31 October 2003 deadline for Iran to provide full cooperation and to take any actions necessary to remedy all failures identified by the Agency, including:
⋅ providing a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the enrichment program, and collaborating with the Agency in identifying the source, date of receipt, storage locations, and use of those imports;
⋅ granting unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to any locations deemed necessary by the Agency for verification purposes; and ⋅ resolving outstanding questions, particularly on the scope of Iran's enrichment and conversion activities.
Finally, the resolution requested the cooperation of third countries in clarifying outstanding questions and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol. The resolution concluded by requesting the Director General to continue his efforts to resolve the outstanding issues, and to submit a report in November 2003 on the implementation of the resolution, "enabling the Board to draw definitive conclusions." Although adopted without a vote, the resolution did not enjoy total consensus. Only 20 of the 35 members had indicated that they would vote in favor had the resolution been put to a vote. The Non-Aligned Movement issued a statement expressing its reservations with regard to the final resolution, and Iran left the meeting in protest before the official adoption took place. Iran denounced the resolution again in its opening statement to the IAEA General Conference, but reiterated its commitment to the NPT and to the strengthened safeguards regime.
Over the next two months, Agency inspectors continued to conduct safeguards inspections, talk to relevant nuclear personnel, and to carry out other verification activities. The results of the environmental samples taken at Natanz and at the Kalaye Electric Company, both of which had yielded traces of both high and low enriched uranium particles, were discussed with Iranian representatives. During this period, Iran demonstrated on several occasions an increased level of transparency and cooperation with the Agency. On 9 October, a letter was sent to the Agency from Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, providing information on previously undeclared research activities carried out on uranium conversion processes. Iran expressed to the Director General on 18 October its readiness to conclude the Additional Protocol and to accelerate its cooperation, and on 21 October, issued with the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Germany an agreed statement in which Iran agreed to settle all outstanding issues with the IAEA. In the agreement, Iran also announced its decision to sign and commence the ratification process for the Additional Protocol, and to voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. Eight days before the 31 October deadline, Iran provided the Agency with a declaration of its past and current nuclear program. On 10 November, the Agency received Iran's official notification of its acceptance of the draft Additional Protocol text and its willingness to abide by the provisions of the protocol pending its entry into force. Iran also informed the Agency that the actual suspension of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities went into effect from 10 November.
Taking these events into consideration, the Director General issued his third report on 10 November on the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement. The 30-page report acknowledged Iran's increased cooperation, but also contained details on a number of reporting and other failures by Iran to fulfill its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. It referenced at least nine instances of undeclared foreign assistance, including by entities from at least four countries that provided components, material, and information used in Iran's laser enrichment program.
Notable reporting failures included:
⋅ Undeclared reprocessing experiments resulting in the separation of gram quantities of plutonium;
⋅ Undeclared laboratory-scale uranium conversion experiments using imported nuclear materialsome of which, when found to be missing, was intentionally misreported to the Agency as a process loss; and ⋅ An 18-year effort to develop a uranium centrifuge enrichment program and a 12-year effort on the more complex laser enrichment program. These two programs involved undeclared production of small amounts of low enriched uranium, and not only failure "to report a large number of conver-
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In addition, the report contained further details on Iran's heavy water reactor program, including on the planned 40-megawatt (th) heavy water reactor and on the output capacity of its heavy water production plant currently under construction. With regard to Iranian transparency, the report noted, "Iran's policy of concealment continued until [October] , with cooperation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory."
The report stated, "Iran's nuclear programme, as the Agency currently understands it, consists of a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research reactor and associated research and development facilities." It further noted, "While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing." It acknowledged the numerous reporting and other failures by Iran to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, but also noted that recent actions, such as provision of inventory change reports and facility design information, have been taken by Iran in addressing and correcting these failures. The report concluded, "To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme. However, given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the Agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes." In this regard, the report noted the necessity of Iranian implementation of the Additional Protocol and of full cooperation from relevant third countries. Remarking on the resolution's adoption, the Director General stated, "This is a good day for peace, multilateralism, and non-proliferation," but also noted that much verification work remains to be done.
In continuance with this verification work, the Agency carried out ad hoc inspections at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) and the Natanz facility, conducted design information verification at TNRC, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC), and obtained complimentary access at ENTC and Karaj between the 8 th and 16 th of December.
On 18 December, Iran signed the Protocol Additional to its Safeguards Agreement. Iran also specified the scope of suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities in a 29 December Note Verbale. These activities would be suspended immediately, and included:
⋅ all activities at the Natanz enrichment facility; ⋅ the production of all feed material for enrichment ant the importation of enrichment-related items;
⋅ the operation and/or testing of any centrifuges, either with or without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)at Natanz; ⋅ further introduction of nuclear material in any centrifuges; and ⋅ the installation of new centrifuges at the PFEP and the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.
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In addition, Iran agreed to withdraw nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment facility if and to the extent practicable. According to UN inspectors, Col. Qadhafi had been buying complete sets of uranium enrichment centrifuges (apparently a few thousand) on the international black market for a secret nuclear bomb program. However, the centrifuges were still dismantled in boxes, IAEA Director General EBaradei reported on January 16, and no evidence of nuclear weapons activities was found. Some sources have confirmed that Libya acquired two different types of centrifuges. The designs for at least one of the centrifuge models were very similar to European-developed centrifuges that Iran is suspected of acquiring from Pakistan.
LIBYA:
On January 28, the IAEA issued a note to its Member States saying that inspectors had just completed the initial phase of their work in Libya, which included an inventory of sensitive nuclear components and materials and the application of IAEA seals. Also, the IAEA inspectors provided logistical support to the U.S. and U.K. personnel who removed these materials from the country with the agreement of Libyan authorities. On February 20, The Director General issued a report detailing Libya's nuclear activities since the early 1980s. The report recognizes Libya's cooperation in granting unrestricted access to all locations of interest to the Agency, and in providing documentation related to its undeclared nuclear activities. In particular, the report identifies a number of reporting failures that rendered Libya in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. These failures include the import of UF6 and other uranium compounds and their subsequent storage; activities involving conversion of uranium oxides, UF4, and uranium metal; the fabrication and irradiation of uranium targets; the separation of a small amount of plutonium; the provision of information for the pilot centrifuge facility; the provision of design information for the uranium conversion facility; and the provision of design information for hot cells associated with the research reactor. The report also observes that Libya's undeclared nuclear activities relied heavily on the importation of nuclear material and key equipment. The Agency is currently in the process of investigating the supply routes and sources of these materials and equipment.
On March 10, Libya signed a Protocol Additional to its Safeguards Agreement. The Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Libya. The resolution essentially praises Libya's cooperation with the agency, includ- 
1990:
In mid-April, Col. Qadhafi called for the inclusion of a nuclear component in the development of a multifaceted deterrent force.
DPRK:
The DPRK joined the NPT in 1985 and its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Agency entered into force in 1992. However, since 1993 the IAEA has been unable to verify Pyongyang's compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.
Between 1994 and 2002, the Agreed Framework was a tool aimed at bringing the DPRK into compliance with its safeguards obligations. However, the reports about a clandestine uranium enrichment program, the end of the "freeze" pursuant to the Agreed Framework, and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors brought this phase to an end. Responding to this, the international community initiated separate negotiations, the six-party talks between the DPRK, China, Russia, Japan, the ROK, and the United States. However, since that time the Board has continually called for the DPRK to remedy its noncompliance with its safeguards agreements and noted with concern that the DPRK has not permitted Agency verification since December of 2002; the IAEA is therefore unable to provide assurances on its nuclear material or activities.
2005:
On 3 March, the Chairman of the Board expressed serious concern over the DPRK's recent announcements that it would suspend indefinitely and then re-engage in the six-party talks. Further, the Chairman called the DPRK's nuclear issue "a serious challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime as well as to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia."
On 14 June, the director general, in a statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, stated that "The Agency stands ready to work with the DPRK -and with all others -towards a solution that addresses the needs of the international community to ensure that all nuclear activities in the DPRK are exclusively for peaceful purposes, as well as addressing the security needs of the DPRK."
On 26 September, the director general, in a statement to the Forty-Ninth Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, welcomed "that the DPRK has expressed its commitment "to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and [to return], at an early date, to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards." The director general called the agreement reached by the six-party talks "a significant step forward."
On 24 November, the director general updated the Board of Governors on implementation of safeguards in the DPRK. The director general stated that the agency has not performed any verification activities in the DPRK since December 2002 and therefore cannot provide any assurance about DPRK´s nuclear activities since that time.
2004:
On 17 March, the Director General informed the Board that his letter to the DPRK had elicited no response and that the DPRK's stated re-starting of its 5 MW reactor at Yongbyong constituted a further safeguards agreement violation. He also said "the situation in the DPRK is currently the most immediate and most serious threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime."
On 16 August the Director General, in a report to the Board, recalled that since 1993 the Agency has not been able to implement fully its comprehensive safeguards agreement and advised that the agreement still is in force with the DPRK.
The Board resolution of 24 September noted with concern the DPRK's repeated official statements declaring its intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force and its announcement that it had reprocessed 800 spent fuel rods; it called on the State to completely and promptly dismantle any nuclear weapons program.
2003:
On 6 January, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2003/3 calling on the DPRK to comply with the Safeguards Agreement and readmit inspectors, deploring in the strongest terms the DPRK's unilateral actions. The resolution also affirmed that unless the DPRK fully cooperates with the Agency, the DPRK will be in further noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement. It requested the Director General to transmit the Board's resolution to the DPRK, to continue to pursue ur-
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On 10 January, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT stating that its withdrawal "will come into force automatically and immediately" on the next day. It stated that it had suspended its 1994 withdrawal from the NPT on the last day of the required three-month notice period and thus did not need to give a further notice to other NPT Parties and Security Council as required under Article X.
On 12 February, the Board of Governors adopted a third resolution (GOV/2003/3) on 12 February 2003, declaring that North Korea was "in further noncompliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement pursuant to the NPT" and decided to report "to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, North Korea's continued noncompliance and the Agency's inability to verify nondiversion of nuclear material that is subject to safeguards."
Although no statement to this effect has been issued by the NPT State Parties, the generally held view is that North Korea's withdrawal came into effect on 10 April 2003, when its three-month notice of withdrawal expired.
During the 47 th session of the General Conference, IAEA Member States adopted a resolution expressing concern with regard to the nuclear actions taken by North Korea. They called upon the DPRK to reconsider its actions and statements and accept and fully comply with comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and strongly encouraged diplomatic efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue.
2002:
No tangible progress has been made with respect to safeguards in the DPRK. The Agency continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the country. On 16 October, North Korea admitted that it had been conducting a clandestine nuclear weapons development program for the past several years. The Director General expressed great concern regarding the information reported by the United States and urged both countries to provide information on this report.
On 29 November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted Resolution GOV/2002/60 on the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DPRK at its meeting in Vienna. The Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, in a message to the DPRK confirmed the Agency's readiness to dispatch a senior team to the DPRK, or to receive a DPRK team in Vienna, to discuss the general question of implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DPRK.
In December, the DPRK requested that the IAEA remove seals and monitoring cameras at all of its nuclear facilities. The DPRK also announced that it would lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities maintained pursuant to the 1994 Agreed Framework and to resume operations of these facilities for power generation on 12 December, 2002. Subsequently, the DPRK cut most of the seals and impeded the functioning of surveillance equipment installed at both the fuel rod fabrication plant and the reprocessing facility. Furthermore, in response to the DPRK's request, IAEA inspectors left the country at the end of December 2002.
2001:
As of December 2001, the Agency was unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial report of the nuclear material made by the DPRK, and, therefore, unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material. The IAEA considers Pyongyang to be in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement that remains binding and in force.
2000:
In his Statement to the 2000 NPT Review Conference in New York on 24 April, 2000, the Director General noted that with regard to the DPRK, there was regrettably little to report since the 1995 NPT Conference and that the DPRK remained in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement
The DPRK continued to accept IAEA activities solely in the context of the "Agreed Framework," which it concluded in October 1994 with the United States. As requested by the Security Council, the Agency was monitoring a "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities under that agreement.
In November 2000, the IAEA Secretary-General voiced hope that with the recent positive developments on the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK would soon be ready to commence active co-operation with the Agency so that it can verify that all nuclear material in the country, subject to safeguards, had been declared. The Agency was permitted by the DPRK to identify some of the documents that needed to be preserved for verification.
1999:
Technical rounds held in March and December 1999 yielded little to no progress. At the June 1999 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General noted again the Secretariat's continued inability to verify the DPRK's initial inventory declaration, and that the DPRK remained in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement. He further said that there remained a fundamental differ-
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© Center for Nonproliferation Studies IAEA-27 ence of view between the Agency and the DPRK regarding the status of the Safeguards Agreement. The Agency viewed the Safeguards Agreement as binding and in force, while the DPRK did not accept all the measures required under the Safeguards Agreement. In practice, the DPRK accepted ad hoc and routine inspections at facilities not subject to the freeze mandated by the Agreed Framework without major difficulties. The DPRK also continued to link progress with the IAEA to the implementation of the Agreed Framework.
1998:
As there was also no progress made during the ninth round of technical discussions in February 1998, the Director General emphasized to the Board of Governors in June that the Agency continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial report and could not verify that there had been no diversion of nuclear material. Furthermore, the canning operation of spent fuel rods had been suspended in April at the DPRK's request; 97 percent of the irradiated discharged rods were canned and under Agency seal by that time. Further technical rounds in June and October 1998 did not lead to any progress.
1997:
At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 1997, the Director General reported that the seventh round of technical discussions, which took place on 20-24 January, 1997, in Pyongyang, also produced few results. No progress was made on the issues of the preservation of information or the reprocessing plant. The Director General informed the Board that the Agency inspectors had a continuous presence in the Yongbyon area to monitor the freeze. As of August 1997, the canning operation for the irradiated fuel rods from the 5 MWe reactor, which started in April 1996, was about 90 percent complete. The rods were placed in containers under Agency seals. In January 1997, the DPRK clarified that the nuclear graphite manufactured for use at the 5 MWe power reactor was subject to IAEA monitoring. In October 1997, at the eighth round of technical discussions, no progress was made on the outstanding issues.
1994:
On 13 June 1994, the DPRK, which had been an IAEA Member State since 1974, announced its withdrawal from the Agency. The withdrawal did not affect the DPRK's obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, which in the Agency's view remained binding and in force. The DPRK asserted that it was in a special position with regard to the Safeguards Agreement and that it was no longer obliged to allow the inspectors to carry out their work under agreement.
1993:
The IAEA Board of Governors on 1 April 1993 concluded that the DPRK was in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement and, in line with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, referred this non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
IRAQ:
The 
